RiskFundV2 (current BNB mainnet custody)

RiskFundV2 is the BNB Chain mainnet protocol-fund custody contract. It holds raw ERC-20 balances and receives USDT from RiskFundBuyback. It does not maintain a current per-Comptroller or per-pool reserve ledger, and it does not support native BNB.

Caution

The current implementation is not the former per-pool RiskFund API. The VIP-620/VIP-621 migration removed poolAssetsFunds, updatePoolState, and sweepTokenFromPool. Do not build against those selectors even if an old merged proxy artifact or explorer view still displays them.

At BNB Chain mainnet block 118349571 (August 27, 2026, 08:12:46 UTC), the proxy and implementation were:

Contract	Address
RiskFundV2 proxy	0xdF31a28D68A2AB381D42b380649Ead7ae2A76E42
Implementation	0x01BE9c56A0844040b2c1a684B1a72cE88489486a

The proxy’s owner() getter returned the Normal Timelock, convertibleBaseAsset() returned BNB Chain mainnet USDT, and shortfall() returned the deployed Shortfall proxy. The raw USDT balance was about 3.41 million USDT, while getPoolsBaseAssetReserves returned zero for every PoolRegistry pool. Balances and governance configuration can change; read them again for current operations.

Current source: protocol-reserve@eaed4e3: RiskFundV2.sol.

State getters

convertibleBaseAsset

ERC-20 asset used for the Shortfall-compatible transfer path. On BNB Chain mainnet this is USDT, not native BNB.

function convertibleBaseAsset() external view returns (address);

shortfall

Only this configured address can call transferReserveForAuction.

function shortfall() external view returns (address);

maxLoopsLimit

Deprecated state retained for proxy-storage compatibility. The current RiskFundV2 logic does not use it to iterate pools.

function maxLoopsLimit() external view returns (uint256);

Governance configuration

setConvertibleBaseAsset

Updates the ERC-20 base asset used by transferReserveForAuction.

function setConvertibleBaseAsset(address convertibleBaseAsset_) external;

Requirement	Detail
Access	onlyOwner
Validation	The new address must be nonzero.
Event	ConvertibleBaseAssetUpdated(oldConvertibleBaseAsset, newConvertibleBaseAsset)

setShortfallContractAddress

Updates the only caller authorized to request reserves through the auction-compatible path.

function setShortfallContractAddress(address shortfallContractAddress_) external;

Requirement	Detail
Access	onlyOwner
Validation	The new address must be nonzero.
Event	ShortfallContractUpdated(oldShortfallContract, newShortfallContract)

Token movement

sweepToken

Transfers any ERC-20 held by RiskFundV2 to a governance-selected recipient. It is not limited to the configured base asset or to a pool-attributed balance.

function sweepToken(
    address tokenAddress,
    address to,
    uint256 amount
) external;

Requirement	Detail
Access	onlyOwner
Reentrancy	nonReentrant
Validation	Token, recipient, and amount must be nonzero; amount cannot exceed the contract’s raw token balance.
Event	SweepToken(tokenAddress, to, amount)

The contract does not reserve a portion for a Comptroller before this balance check. Governance procedures must determine whether a proposed sweep is appropriate.

transferReserveForAuction

Transfers the configured base asset from RiskFundV2 to Shortfall.

function transferReserveForAuction(
    address comptroller,
    uint256 amount
) external returns (uint256);

Requirement	Detail
Access	msg.sender must equal shortfall(). Otherwise the call reverts with InvalidShortfallAddress.
Reentrancy	nonReentrant
Balance	amount cannot exceed the raw convertibleBaseAsset balance.
Attribution	comptroller is not used for accounting; it is emitted in TransferredReserveForAuction.
Return	The amount transferred.

This selector remains for Shortfall compatibility, but BNB Chain mainnet Shortfall auctions are paused. It must not be interpreted as an active automated recovery route.

Compatibility getter

getPoolsBaseAssetReserves

function getPoolsBaseAssetReserves(
    address comptroller
) external view returns (uint256);

The current implementation ignores comptroller and always returns 0. This preserves the selector expected by Shortfall while preventing a legacy auction from sizing a per-pool reserve against the global raw balance.

Returning zero does not itself cause startAuction to revert: if auctions were resumed and other requirements were satisfied, the old sizing logic would see zero pool-attributed risk-fund value. The current protection against new starts and restarts is the separate Shortfall.auctionsPaused() state.

Removed legacy selectors

The following former RiskFund paths are not part of the current implementation:

• sweepTokenFromPool;
• updatePoolState;
• poolAssetsFunds;
• the RiskFundConverter callback path; and
• in-contract PancakeSwap conversion settings and execution.

Conversion now occurs in RiskFundBuyback, and former storage positions remain reserved only for upgrade compatibility. See RiskFundV2 storage and TokenBuyback.