SpokePoolLens

SpokePoolLens is the read aggregator for hub-funded spoke pools. It reports the state those pools add on top of an isolated pool, and mirrors the rest of PoolLens under the same names and struct shapes, so reading a spoke pool takes one lens address rather than two.

Like PoolLens it is a standalone immutable deployment, not a proxy, and is versioned by redeployment. It is on develop rather than in the v4.4.0 release, so match the bytecode or verified source before decoding tuples. Deployed addresses are on the spoke pools page.

Deployment scope

This page matches the source on develop. Which markets a lens call returns, and every value inside the structs, are live pool state: read them at the block an integration uses.

Clock

constructor(bool timeBased_, uint256 blocksPerYear_, uint256 maxBorrowRateMantissa_)

Same clock as PoolLens: when timeBased_ is true, blocksPerYear_ must be zero, otherwise it must be nonzero. The lens clock must match the reward distributors whose pending rewards it calculates. The inherited isTimeBased, blocksOrSecondsPerYear and getBlockNumberOrTimestamp read it back.

maxBorrowRateMantissa_ is stored as the public immutable MAX_BORROW_RATE_MANTISSA. It must equal the borrow rate cap SpokeVTokenImpl is deployed with, because VToken does not expose its cap and the lens needs it to mirror accrual. It reads 5e12 on BNB Chain and BNB Chain testnet. A beacon upgrade that changes the cap needs a new lens.

Spoke return structures

struct SpokePoolData {
    string name;
    address creator;
    address comptroller;
    uint256 blockPosted;
    uint256 timestampPosted;
    string category;
    string logoURL;
    string description;
    address priceOracle;
    uint256 closeFactor;
    uint256 poolLiquidationIncentiveMantissa;
    uint256 minLiquidatableCollateral;
    address deviationBoundedOracle;
    bool liquidationAllowlistEnabled;
    SpokeVTokenMetadata[] vTokens;
}

SpokePoolData is PoolLens.PoolData with two fields added, one renamed and one retyped. deviationBoundedOracle is the oracle that bounds prices on every collateral-factor check (borrow, redeem, transfer, exitMarket); it is zero until governance sets it, and while it is zero borrowing reverts, as do redeem, transfer and exitMarket for an account that has entered the market and moves a nonzero amount. liquidationAllowlistEnabled says whether seizing collateral is restricted to allowlisted accounts. liquidationIncentive is renamed poolLiquidationIncentiveMantissa, because a spoke market can carry its own incentive instead of the pool-wide one. vTokens holds SpokeVTokenMetadata instead of VTokenMetadata.

struct SpokeVTokenMetadata {
    address vToken;
    uint256 exchangeRateCurrent;
    uint256 supplyRatePerBlockOrTimestamp;
    uint256 borrowRatePerBlockOrTimestamp;
    uint256 reserveFactorMantissa;
    uint256 supplyCaps;
    uint256 borrowCaps;
    uint256 totalBorrows;
    uint256 totalReserves;
    uint256 totalSupply;
    uint256 totalCash;
    bool isListed;
    uint256 collateralFactorMantissa;
    uint256 liquidationThresholdMantissa;
    address underlyingAssetAddress;
    uint256 vTokenDecimals;
    uint256 underlyingDecimals;
    uint256 pausedActions;
    uint256 effectiveLiquidationIncentiveMantissa;
    uint256 ownLiquidationIncentiveMantissa;
    bool supplyAllowlistEnabled;
    bool forcedLiquidationEnabled;
    bool boundedPricingEnabled;
}

Two differences from PoolLens.VTokenMetadata matter to an integrator.

The accrual basis is not the same. PoolLens reports the stored figures, so its exchangeRateCurrent is really exchangeRateStored. Here exchangeRateCurrent, totalBorrows and totalReserves include interest accrued up to the current block or second, with two exceptions. When the borrow rate is above MAX_BORROW_RATE_MANTISSA, no interest is added, because the market’s own accrual would revert. When totalSupply is zero, exchangeRateCurrent is the stored rate. Accrual may also move reserves to the ProtocolShareReserve, lowering reserves and cash by the same amount; neither totalReserves nor totalCash shows that move, and the exchange rate does not depend on it.

The added fields are the spoke-only state. liquidationThresholdMantissa sits in the middle of the struct, after collateralFactorMantissa, so a decoder written for PoolLens.VTokenMetadata misreads every field after it. It is the weight applied to collateral when checking liquidation: a position becomes liquidatable once its debt exceeds its collateral weighted by this value. setCollateralFactor rejects a threshold below the collateral factor, so it is always at or above collateralFactorMantissa. effectiveLiquidationIncentiveMantissa is the incentive in force for the market, and ownLiquidationIncentiveMantissa is its market-specific value or zero when it uses the pool-wide one. supplyAllowlistEnabled and forcedLiquidationEnabled are the market’s own switches. boundedPricingEnabled says whether the bounded oracle has bounded pricing on for this market’s underlying asset. When it is false, the oracle returns the spot price, which the prices alone cannot show. It is also false when the pool has no bounded oracle, and then borrowing reverts, as do redeem, transfer and exitMarket for an account that has entered the market and moves a nonzero amount.

struct SpokeSupplyPermission {
    address vToken;
    bool allowlistEnabled;
    bool accountAllowlisted;
}

struct SpokeVTokenPrices {
    address vToken;
    uint256 spotPrice;
    uint256 boundedCollateralPrice;
    uint256 boundedDebtPrice;
}

SpokeVTokenPrices reports both pricing paths at once. Collateral-factor checks (borrow, redeem, transfer, exitMarket) use the bounded pair; liquidation-threshold checks use spot on both legs. boundedCollateralPrice can sit below spot, and boundedDebtPrice above it, only while the bounded oracle’s protection is active for the asset. Both are zero while the pool has no bounded oracle, which is also the state in which every collateral-factor check reverts. Both are also zero when the bounded oracle’s getBoundedPricesView reverts for the asset.

Shared return structures

VTokenBalances, VTokenUnderlyingPrice, PendingReward, RewardSummary, RewardTokenState, BadDebt and BadDebtSummary are unchanged from PoolLens, field for field.

Read and aggregation API

Spoke-specific reads:

Function	Result
getAllSpokePools(poolRegistry)	every pool in a SpokePoolRegistry, enriched with Comptroller and market data
getSpokePoolByComptroller(poolRegistry, comptroller)	one spoke pool selected by its Comptroller proxy address
getSpokePoolData(poolRegistry, venusPool)	enrich a registry VenusPool structure
spokeVTokenMetadata(vToken) / spokeVTokenMetadataAll(vTokens)	market metadata including the spoke-only fields
spokeVTokenPrices(vToken) / spokeVTokenPricesAll(vTokens)	spot and bounded prices for a market’s underlying
spokeSupplyPermissions(comptroller, vTokens, account)	per market, allowlistEnabled and accountAllowlisted; the account may supply when !allowlistEnabled || accountAllowlisted
spokeLiquidationPermission(comptroller, liquidator)	(allowlistEnabled, accountAllowlisted); the account may seize when !allowlistEnabled || accountAllowlisted

Reads shared with PoolLens, same signatures and results:

Function	Result
getVTokenForAsset(poolRegistry, comptroller, asset)	VToken for an underlying within a pool
getPoolsSupportedByAsset(poolRegistry, asset)	Comptroller proxies registered for an asset
getPendingRewards(account, comptroller)	accrued and simulated pending rewards by distributor
getPoolBadDebt(comptroller)	pool and per-market bad debt valued through the pool oracle
vTokenBalances(vToken, account) / vTokenBalancesAll(vTokens, account)	per-account balances and allowances
vTokenUnderlyingPrice(vToken) / vTokenUnderlyingPriceAll(vTokens)	oracle price data

Pass a SpokePoolRegistry to the registry-taking reads. The Isolated Pools PoolRegistry does not hold spoke pools, and a call against it reverts rather than returning nothing: getAllSpokePools reverts on BNB Chain when given the Isolated Pools registry 0x9F7b01A536aFA00EF10310A162877fd792cD0666.

vTokenBalances and vTokenBalancesAll are non-view because they call interest-accruing VToken functions. Use eth_call for offchain simulation; do not invoke the large aggregation functions from another contract or in an on-chain transaction.

What the lens will not tell you

Access-controlled call permissions are deliberately absent. AccessControlManager derives the role from its own caller, so asked from a lens it answers false for an account that can in fact make the call. Check those against the Comptroller and the ACM directly.

Registry membership and lens output do not establish product lifecycle. A returned pool or market can still be paused, unlisted, or retained only for exit and bad-debt duties.